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Abstract 
Using a panel-model approach, this paper investigates the validity of the relationship between 
level of tax revenues and type of voting. The data-set covers the period 2000-2010, and includes 
135 countries. The main finding points out that the assumed function is linear and the 
compulsory vote tends to increase the tax revenues collected by public authority. The analysis in 
this paper covers the “gap” in the literature in this field.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
The tax revenues represent the most important financing source for government. As Musgrave 
(1959) notes, the state collects taxes and allocates them in order to fulfil three main functions in 
economy: allocation, distribution, and economic stabilization. Based on the social contract, it is 
very clear that the tax payment represents a constitutional duty for citizens, and a right for the 
government. Even so, there are a lot of taxpayers who don’t pay the taxes.  
Several determinants are relevant in this way. Studying some papers in this area (e.g. Torgler 
2005 and 2006, Martínez-Vázquez and Torgler 2005, Prieto et al. 2006, Torgler and Schneider 
2007, Alm and Torgler 2006, and Cummings et al. 2007), Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2008) 
group the factors in four categories:  
(a) Socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age, marital status, education, employment status, 
religiosity, and social class; 
(b) Political and social attitudes: trust in courts, the legal system, politicians and democracy in 
general, national pride, social capital, the perceived level of corruption, and voting behaviour; 
(c) Fiscal parameters: tax rates, the fine rate, audit probability, risk aversion, and personal 
income. 
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(d) Contextual determinants: differences in the extent of direct democracy, language 
fragmentation or the existence of regional cleavages. 
 
In the public choice approach, the voters, as taxpayers, approve the level and structure of 
taxation, and accept to pay the taxes, only if they receive benefits from public goods or obtain 
some financial socio-economic transfers. The collective vector is a result obtained at 
constitutional or post-constitutional stage of decision. Regarding this vector, almost all literature 
in the field investigates it considering the voting as voluntary.   
What happen when the voting is compulsory? Does it influence the collected tax revenues? If 
yes, which is the magnitude of this impact?  
 
This paper answers at these questions, studying the impact of type of voting on the tax revenues, 
based on a panel-model approach. The data-set covers the period 2000-2010, and includes 135 
countries. The main finding stresses that the assumed function is linear, type of voting having a 
significant impact on the level of collected tax revenues. The analysis in this paper covers the 
“gap” in the literature in this field.  
 
Even if the literature is very poor, there are some results in this direction. Some authors suggest 
that there is a strong connection between collected tax revenues and type of voting (Lomasky 
and Brennen, 2000; Hill, 2002; Briggs and Celis, 2008; and Holder, 2010), while other 
researchers don’t find any correlation in this way (Brooki, 2008; Level, 2009 and Usher; 2011).   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the literature review. Section 3 
presents the methodology and the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
 
Which is the best type of voting: voluntary of compulsory? Even if the voluntary voting is 
predominant in the world, there are 32 countries or sub-states entities which have compulsory 
voting. The choosing of voting type system is a very debatable issue in the socio-political 
spectrum. Jakee and Sun (2006) emphasise that the normative debate over compulsory voting 
“typically asks whether voting should be viewed” as a civic duty, or as a right. If the civil duty 
implies compulsory voting, the civil right implies voluntary voting. 
As the payment of taxes is a duty, the taxpayers are likely to become more responsible of 
taxation aspects if the voting is compulsory. In this context, the tax evasion and avoidance are 
minimal, while the collection of tax revenues increases. The relationship between collected tax 
revenues and type of voting was less investigated in the literature. However, there are authors 
that claim the existence of this connection, but with different directions, while others stress that 
there is no significant correlation. 
 
Regarding the first group of researchers, Lomasky and Brennen (2000) promote the idea that, 
having the same direction, the tax revenues are strongly connected with the type of voting.  
They argue that the failing to vote is morally indifferent: "one does not morally better to vote 
than, say, spend the time playing golf instead". For the authors, this type of reasoning is valid in 
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respect to voluntary systems than it does in mandatory system. Thus, there would be no strong 
duty to pay taxes in a voluntary tax system. As a consequence, the compulsory voting can 
increase the tax revenues collected by government than in the case of voluntary system. 
Hill (2002) analyses what happen when the voter avoids the tax payment under a voluntary 
system. In this situation, as the voting is voluntary, the taxpayers don’t see any importance of 
state’s functions. In the opposite side, as the author notes, the compulsory voting under collective 
action make taxpayers to appreciate the system utility of taxation, and encourages them to pay 
the taxes, improving in this way the collection of government tax revenues. 
 
The same conclusion finds Holder (2010). He models compulsory voting, stressing that this type 
of vote increases the total government spending and taxes. Moreover, the effect on public goods 
provision is ambiguous. 
Other researchers defend the existence of the connection, but with a contrary sign. Briggs and 
Celis (2008) investigate the impact of compulsory voting upon differential turnout rates in 
Britain and Belgium. Showing that “taxpayers who do vote could see a small percentage 
reduction in the amount of taxation that they are eligible to pay”, the authors reveal there is a 
significant correlation between voting action and tax revenues, but by opposite direction. 
Finally, the last opinions promote the idea that there is no evidence regarding the relationship 
between collection of tax revenues and type of voting. Brooki (2008) studies the connection 
between tax revenues as percent in GDP and type of voting system, using 9 variables for a 
sample size of 109 countries. The main finding shows that the most important independent 
variable, compulsory voting law, is not significant. The second result illustrates that compulsory 
voting law is not correlated with government spending. 
 
Level (2009) focuses on the justification of compulsory voting. The author considers that the 
duty to pay taxes is applied whether or not one is a citizen. This thing depends by “ability to pay, 
proportionality, and even redistributive justice that are absent from the case for compulsory 
voting”. Usher (2011) analyses the duty to vote. The authors emphasise that the voluntary voting 
becomes preferable to compulsory voting. In this context, the outcome of elections is not 
affected by a tax or fee on voting if the tax is appropriately redistributed.  
Based on these theoretical foundations, we find some new evidence regarding the relationship 
between the collected tax revenues and type of voting, using a panel-model approach, with 135 
countries, for the period 2000-2010.  
 
 
3.  Methodology and Results 
 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between collected tax revenues and type of voting, we 
consider two variables: the tax revenues, as a dependent variable, and the type of voting, as 
independent variable. The data-set includes 135 countries, covering the period 2000-2010 (Table 
1, in Appendix). The level of economic development, form of socio-economic system, culture, 
geographic position, and type of political regime are the main criterions for selection of the 
considered countries.  
 
The variables are as follow: 
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(a) The tax revenues (r) illustrate the amount of tax revenues collected by general government in 
U.S. dollars. The data has been taken from the International Monetary Fund online data-base. 
(b) Type of voting (v) is a dummy variable. It is 1 if the country has mandatory voting and 0 if 
the country has voluntary voting.  
The main hypothesis of this analysis is that the type of voting (voluntary or compulsory) 
determines the level of collected tax revenues, based on a function with this shape: 
 
)(vfr = ,                                                                 (1) 
 
where r - the amount of tax revenues in U.S. dollars, and v - the voting type. These two variables 
are exogenous variables, as Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2011) note.  
 
For investigate this function, we consider a panel-data model, using several scenarios (models 1-
8, Table 2, in Appendix).  
The basic OLS naïv model 1, using natural logarithmic transformation of variable r, is as 
follows: 
 
ititit vr εβα ++=  )ln( ,                                                       (2) 
 
where α - intercept, β - slop,  i - country, t - time and remainder, and itε  - the error term, which 
varies over both country, and time.  
 
In the case of model 1, the results of Ramsey’s Reset Tests, assuming square and cube, cube 
only, and square only, suggest a linear relationship between natural logarithm of tax revenues 
and type of voting.  
In order to find a good specification, we have tested three control variables: GDP, fiscal balance 
and adult literacy index (only GDP and adult literacy rate are treated as elasticity, the fiscal 
balance having negative values). GDP and fiscal balance are variables with major impact on tax 
revenues, while adult literacy index is a cultural proxy variable for tax conformation.   
(c) GDP (gdp) represents the GDP in U.S. dollars. The source of the data is World Bank online 
data-base. 
(d) Fiscal balance (b) reflects the amount of fiscal balance as percent in GDP. The data has been 
taken from the International Monetary Fund online data-base. 
(e) Adult literacy index (l) is a measure used to determine how many adults can read and write in 
a certain area or nation as percent in total adult population. The source of the data is United 
Nations Development Programme online data-base. 
The extended linear model becomes: 
  
itititititit lbgdpvr εββββα +++++= )ln()()ln()ln( 4321 ,                           (3) 
 
where α - intercept, β - slope,  i - country, t - time and remainder, and itε  - the error term, which 
varies over both country and time.  
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Based on Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criterions, Table 2 shows that the OLS model 8 
can be considered representative to describe the connection between tax revenues and type of 
voting.   
In relation (2), the error term itε can be itiit µλε += , with iλ - constant across individuals, and 
itµ - normally distributed error or, in other words, ),0( 2µσµ Nit ≈ . 
Thus, other two types of panel models can be performed in this case: 
(a) Fixed-effects models, with this shape: 
 
itititititiit lbgdpvr µββββλα ++++++= )(ln)()ln()()ln( 4321 ,                  (4) 
 
where iλ is part of a constant, but varies by individual, and 
(b) Random-effects models, which can be specified as follows: 
 
)()ln()()ln()ln( 4321 itiititititit lbgdpvr µλββββα ++++++= ,                    (5) 
 
where iλ is part of an error term (error variances varying across groups and/or times). 
As the panel-data model may have heterogeneity in the data, we analyze this propriety in both 
cases of fixed and random effects panel-models types (Table 3). First, we perform the hypothesis 
tests to choose between pooled model and fixed-effects model (cross-section), respectively 
random-effects model. Second, we study the hypothesis tests to choose between fixed-effects 
model and random-effects model. 
 
The null hypothesis of no cross-sectional heterogeneity is rejected with F-statistic F(132,1297) = 
62.4523 (p-value=0.00). F-test illustrates that cross-sectional fixed model 9 is preferred to the 
pooled model 8.  
The Breusch-Pagan test for the random-effects has the Chi-square= 5049.36, with p-value=0.00, 
so the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional heterogeneity is rejected. The random model (10) is 
preferred to the pooled model 8.  
Finally, for the random-effects model 10, the Hausman test, with a Chi-square= 26.3163 (p-
value=0.00), suggests that the fixed-effects model 9 is preferred to random-effects model 10.  
As the model 9 has an estimation problem in respect to variables v, we fix this think performing 
a new model 11, with robust standard errors. 
Therefore, the last model 11 can be considered representative and stable to describe the 
relationship between tax revenues and type of voting. The empirical results, in the case of 135 
investigated countries, reveal that all considered determinants have significant impact on tax 
revenues. 
 
This means that the level of collected tax revenues depends upon type of voting (as it is 
compulsory or voluntary), having the same direction in respect to dummy variable v, under 
positive impact of GDP, sold of fiscal balance and adult literacy index. In other words, a 
compulsory vote tends to increase the tax revenues collected by public authority. 
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4.  Conclusions 
 
 
The citizens have a different behaviour in respect to vote, as it is viewed as civil duty or civil 
right. If the vote is compulsory, they can be more responsible regarding the tax payment. In this 
way, the empirical results point out a strong relationship between type of voting and collected tax 
revenues, under significant and positive influence of GDP, sold of fiscal balance and adult 
literacy rate. As the two main investigated variables have the same sign, collected tax revenues 
tends to increase only if the vote is viewed as a civil duty. In the other words, the compulsory 
voting improves the collection of tax revenues. 
 
The transmission channel has a motivational reason. On the one hand, if the voting is voluntary 
(civil right), the taxpayers don’t realize the entirely importance of taxes. Thus, the taxes become 
“voluntary” trough the evasion and avoidance phenomena. On the other hand, if the voting is 
compulsory (civil duty), the taxpayers view the taxation as a very important “duty”. In this case, 
they reject almost all possibilities of tax evasion and tax avoidance.     
In the context of tax-policy implications, the study suggests that a significant increase of 
collected tax revenues, without a major negative reaction of taxpayers, can be easily obtained by 
public authority if the voting is compulsory. Concerning taxation, as the main government 
financing source, there is no doubt that compulsory voting gains the battle over voluntary voting.    
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: List of analyzed countries 
Countries 
Afghanistan, I.R. of China,P.R.:Hong Kong Hungary              Malaysia             Rwanda               
Albania Colombia Iceland              Mali                 Samoa 
Algeria              Congo, Dem. Rep. of India Malta                Saudi Arabia 
Argentina Congo, Republic of Indonesia            Mauritius Senegal 
Armenia Costa Rica           Iran, I.R. of Mexico Slovak Republic      
Australia            Côte d'Ivoire        Ireland Moldova              Slovenia 
Austria Croatia Israel               Mongolia             Spain 
Azerbaijan, Rep. of Cyprus               Italy Morocco              Sudan 
Bahrain, Kingdom of Czech Republic Jamaica              Mozambique           Swaziland            
Bangladesh           Denmark              Japan                Nepal Sweden 
Belarus Djibouti             Jordan Netherlands Switzerland          
Belgium Dominican Republic Kazakhstan           New Zealand          Tajikistan 
Benin                Ecuador Kenya                Nicaragua            Togo                 
Bolivia              Egypt                Korea, Republic of Niger                Tonga                
Botswana             El Salvador          Kuwait Nigeria              Trinidad and Tobago 
Brazil Estonia              Kyrgyz Republic      Norway Tunisia 
Brunei Darussalam    Ethiopia             Lao People's Dem.Rep Oman                 Turkey 
Bulgaria             Fiji                 Latvia               Pakistan Uganda               
Burkina Faso         Finland Lebanon              Panama               Ukraine 
Burundi              France Lesotho              Paraguay             United Arab Emirates 
Cambodia             Georgia              Liberia              Peru United Kingdom       
Cameroon             Germany Libya                Philippines United States 
Canada               Ghana                Lithuania            Poland               Uruguay 
Central African Rep. Greece Luxembourg Portugal Uzbekistan           
Chad                 Guatemala            Macedonia, FYR Qatar Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
Chile Guyana               Madagascar Romania Vietnam 
China,P.R.: Mainland Honduras             Malawi               Russian Federation Zambia 
 
Table 2: OLS regressions results 
 Dependent variable: ln(r) (ln tax revenues in $) 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 
(naïve)  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 
9.01018*** 
[132.7] 
(0.0000) 
-1.93462*** 
[-38.00] 
(0.0000) 
9.05598*** 
[133] 
(0.0000) 
9.67504*** 
[131.1] 
(0.0000) 
-1.95227*** 
[-40.89] 
(0.0000) 
-1.49740*** 
[-29.46] 
(0.0000) 
9.73553*** 
[132.1] 
(0.0000) 
-1.51987*** 
[-31.95] 
(0.0000) 
v 
0.768301***
[5.107] 
(0.0000) 
-0.17265*** 
[-6.648] 
(0.0000) 
0.804591*** 
[5.348] 
(0.0000) 
0.423312***
[3.038] 
(0.0024) 
-0.130814*** 
[-5.433] 
(0.0000) 
-0.21653*** 
[-9.293] 
(0.0000) 
0.429668*** 
[3.094] 
(0.0020) 
-0.176228*** 
[-8.218] 
(0.0000) 
ln(gdp) 
 
1.06652*** 
[220.7] 
(0.0000)     
1.06959*** 
[236.6] 
(0.0000) 
1.03704*** 
[226.5] 
(0.0000)   
1.04012*** 
[243.6] 
(0.0000) 
b     
0.0320391*** 
[3.415] 
(0.0007) 
  
0.0228215*** 
[15.40] 
(0.0000) 
  
0.0242495*** 
[6.823] 
(0.0047) 
0.0215964*** 
[16.44] 
(0.0000) 
ln(l)       
2.99668*** 
[16.74] 
(0.0000) 
  
0.607055***
[19.25] 
(0.0000) 
3.04090*** 
[17.11] 
(0.0000) 
0.577412*** 
[19.85] 
(0.0000) 
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 Model summary 
R-squared 0.017609 0.971534 0.024668 0.176328 0.97571 0.977319 0.190351 0.980962 
F-statistic 26.08041 (0.000000) 
24812.60 
(0.000000) 
18.09630 
(0.000000) 
19147.67 
(0.000000) 
155.6331 
(0.000000) 
20869.69 
(0.000000) 
112.0656 
(0.000000) 
18407.73 
(0.000000) 
Akaike 
criterion 6580.816 1423.152 6448.384 6326.067 1155.008 1094.175 6183.407 807.6804 
Schwarz 
criterion 6591.384 1439.004 6464.189 6341.92 1176.081 1115.312 6204.48 834.0215 
Hannan-Quinn 
criterion 6584.759 1429.066 6454.285 6331.982 1162.876 1102.061 6191.275 817.5155 
Ramsey 
RESET Test:  
(1) F-statistic 
(square and 
cube) 
0.000000 
(0.0000)               
(2) F-statistic 
(cube only) 
0.000000 
(0.0000)               
(3) F-statistic 
(square only) 
0.000000 
(0.0000)               
(a) […] denotes the t-stat, while (…) shows the attached probability; 
(b) ***, **, and *   denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3: Fixed and random effects results 
 Dependent variable: ln(r) (ln tax revenues in $) 
Independent variables 
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
FE RE FE with robust 
standard errors 
Constant 
-2.21411*** 
[-21.96] 
(0.0000) 
-1.95282*** 
[-22.50] 
(0.0000) 
-2.21411***  
[-10.91]  
(0.0000) 
v 
0.0831119 
[1.106] 
(0.2689) 
-0.0914977* 
[-1.854] 
(0.0639) 
0.0831119*** 
[9.206]  
(0.0000) 
ln(gdp) 
1.09843*** 
[124]  
(0.0000) 
1.07801*** 
[145.5] 
(0.0000) 
1.09843*** 
[58.91]  
(0.0000) 
b 
0.0159952*** 
[21.42] 
(0.0000) 
0.0164000*** 
[22.06] 
(0.0000) 
0.0159952*** 
[8.447]  
(0.0000) 
ln(l) 
0.452225*** 
[6.932] 
(0.0000) 
0.495490*** 
[9.323] 
(0.0000) 
0.452225** 
[2.494]  
(0.0127) 
 Model summary 
R-squared 0.997412 0.950787 0.997412 
F-statistic 3675.295 6901.965 3675.295 
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(0.000000) (0.000000) (0.0000) 
Akaike criterion -1789.886 928.8419 -1789.886 
Schwarz criterion -1068.14 955.1831 -1068.14 
Hannan-Quinn criterion -1520.404 938.6771 -1520.404 
F test 62.4523 (0.0000)   
62.4523  
(0.0000) 
Breusch-Pagan test   5049.36 (0.0000)   
Hausman test   26.3163 (0.0000)   
(a) […] denotes the t-stat, while (…) shows the attached probability; 
(b) FE and RE denote cross-section fixed-effects, respectively cross-section random-effects. 
(c) ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively. 
 
